Monday, October 6, 2008

New American Militarism

In his book, New American Militarism, author Andrew Bacevich outlines four key concepts of militarism that he argues have been gradually becoming more and more present in United States policy and military use. These concepts include: the scope, cost and configuration of today’s military (p. 15); an increased propensity to use force leading to the normalization of war (p. 18); new aesthetics of war (p. 20); and the boost in status of military institutions and soldiers themselves (p. 23). Bacevich argues that these four pillars have become prevalent in the reasoning behind today’s use of the armed forces, and provides evidence throughout his book that strengthens his arguments of a new American militarism in place. I have found that the second aspect of Bacevich’s definition of militarism is most strongly allied with the war in Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Considering the second point in Bacevich’s four concepts of militarism, “increased propensity to use force,” can be adequately shown by the violation of the Powell doctrine upon entering the war. Regardless of the traditional military procedure for determining whether military action should or should not be used, America entered Iraq without “a clearly defined war strategy, end state, and exit strategy,” in direct violation of the Powell doctrine. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, also exemplified this aspect of militarism with his “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” a list of declarations that he published after joining the Pentagon that included the decree “Reserve the right to get into anything, and exercise it,” (p. 63).
Associated with this is the publication of the Bush doctrine in 2002, which announced a doctrine of “preventive war and permanent military supremacy.” (p. 93). I don’t believe that there could be a more egregious and direct association with militarism than that point. A proactive approach undermines the definition of the word “defense,” and more closely aligns with offensive measures and the use of force to spread American ideals, or as Bacevich calls it, “coercive democracy.” In fact, the Bush doctrine seems to align more closely with what the American Heritage Dictionary defines as militarism: “Predominance of the armed forces in the administration or policy of the state.” By granting himself the ability to act in a preventive manner to provide defense, and exercising that ability immediately, President Bush tacitly incorporated militarism into his administration and his policy.
More conventional arguments for the war in Iraq being only a part of the larger war on terrorism are not wholly developed, and seem to take on an ethnocentric American perspective. We see the war as a result of Islamic extremism and terrorism upon the United States. However, there is a larger context to the story as Bacevich points out in his discussion of World War IV. The role the United States has cast upon itself as an innocent party being thrust into the war by freedom-hating terrorists from the Middle East is not entirely true. A series of events participated in and promulgated by the U.S. over the course of twenty or so years has gradually been increasing anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, and still plays a part in the conflict today. Increasing American militarism and the rise of the second neoconservative movement that sanctified American values as universal and deserving distribution added to the U.S. involvement and introduction to the war in Iraq.

Has the time come to revise the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy?

Professor Notes: Escellent essay that brings in relevant outside material and is fairly and completely argued. Good job!

Btw, here is the article I'm referencing:

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/08/04/080804fa_fact_mcgrath

The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy of the U.S. military has been a controversial issue since its inception and implementation into law under former President Bill Clinton in 1993. The policy, which was intended to place guidelines and principles for dealing with homosexuality and more specifically, homosexual service members, has been less than favorable, among GLBT activists and military personnel alike. However, the reasons behind the DADT legislation have little to do with individual ability and merit, and are designed more as a safeguard for morale and “unit cohesion.” In my opinion, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy is outdated and rooted in homophobia, and it is an unnecessary qualification for individuals wishing to join the United States military
The longstanding controversy regarding homosexuality in the military was well illustrated in our reading “A Soldier’s Legacy.” Major Alan Rogers, who was killed in Iraq in January by an IED, has posthumously become a symbol of the GLBT struggle for rights within the military. Despite Major Rogers’ exemplary service record with the Army, his sexuality became the main subject of interest after his death. With conflicting accounts of how Rogers would like to have been remembered and his multi-faceted life keeping many of his “closest” friends separate from each other, I can understand how the larger narrative could become clouded and lost in the tumult. However, I believe that the most socially relevant aspect of Rogers’ life was the fact that he showed through his twenty years of service that homosexuality is not a determining factor in individual ability. Sexuality does not define success, not even in the Armed Forces. However, success and even admission into the services can be bureaucratically prevented by open declaration of homosexuality.
The “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was the result of a compromise between Clinton (who vowed to end the ban) and the “four-star community,” who was a source of opposition and pressure against ending the ban on gays in the military. It seems to me that the DADT policy is still in place as a consequence of high-ranking homophobia and traditionalist practices within the U.S. Armed Forces. This was evident in the Wikipedia edit-war that ensued following Major Rogers’ death. Enlistees such as Rogers, who was raised for much of his life in a town of less than 500, may often view the military as an opportunity for a better life; however, for gay soldiers like Rogers, this opportunity comes with an additional sacrifice to personal life. As McGrath states in his article, “Of course, being a proud gay officer is tantamount, under the current military policy, to being a retired gay officer with no pension.”
While Rogers compliance with the DADT policy may be seen as evidence of its success, it must be noted that Rogers was an intensely private soldier (“Rogers rarely talked about himself”) and that his ability to thrive in the military despite the institutionalized barriers against him was more of an individual quality than a triumph of the DADT legislation. Indeed, it seems that Rogers’ was personally opposed to the policy, but kept his opinions to himself, especially in military settings. Friend Marty McNeil said “Alan really cared deeply about what people felt about him--people’s respect for him. He went to a lot of effort to maintain that respect.”
I find it difficult to fully understand the arguments against allowing gays to serve openly in the military. It seems that most claim it would produce a negative effect on troop morale. However, the statistics that I’ve seen provide evidence to the contrary. McGrath cites the Washington Post in saying that “seventy-five per cent of Americans now favor repealing ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell,’” and half of all polled veterans agreed. In fact, McGrath also quotes a Zogby poll saying that “among those who felt certain that they had served alongside a gay colleague, about two-thirds did not think troop morale had been affected.” Even high-ranking military personnel have spoken against the policy, especially for turning away otherwise qualified applicants from today’s short-handed military. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili wrote in an opinion-editorial in a January 2007 New York Times saying “I now believe that if gay men and lesbians served openly in the United States military, they would not undermine the efficacy of the armed forces. Our military has been stretched thin by our deployments in the Middle East, and we must welcome the service of any American who is willing and able to do the job.”
The policy of “Don’t ask, don’t tell” is obsolete, unnecessary and a hindrance to much needed recruitment for the military. Arguments in favor of the guidelines are sparse and difficult to find, but mostly seem to come from those who have some type of preexisting involvement with the military, although this is not always the case. The time has definitely come to revise the existing policy, if not remove it entirely.

Shalikashvili, John M. “Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military.” New York Times. Jan. 2,
2007.

The Use of Objectivity in Reporting and the Proposed Role of Journalism as Custodian of Fact

Professor Notes: Good to very good essay. The first section omits key moments in the history of objectivity as a journalistic method: the information model versus story model, McCarthy and Vietnam. The pro-con section is effective, if thin. On the other hand, the Jamieson-Waldman section is excellent, both thorough and thoughtful. Glad to discuss.

I want to make sure to preface this essay by commenting on my professor's notes. In my defense, I wrote this paper (as I do most of my papers) the morning of the day it was due. I woke up at 5am and got to campus at 7:30 so I could speed-write this paper. In addition, we were given a 1,250 word guideline, and after writing the Jamieson-Waldman section (which I wrote first), I had already used over 800 words. Therefore, I picked what I deemed to be the most important highlights for the other two sections and wrote "thinly" on them.

Jeremy Iggers, Good News, Bad News
Michael Schudson, et. al., Discovering the News
Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman, The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories That Shape the Political World


The history of objectivity has its roots in the rise of the penny press during the Jacksonian period of journalism. Before this era, most newspapers were partisan, and their readership consisted of those who agreed with the opinions put forth in the papers. Because of the expense of the papers, most of the consumers who were able to purchase a paper daily were the elite. The revolution of the penny press, however, meant that more people were able to purchase and consume the news, broadening the scope of subject matter that could be covered. This increase in readership also meant that opinions such as those in the partisan press would not be included because of the potential alienation of subscription holders. The beginning of a fact-based news medium was the result.

Another crucial point that amplified the use of objectivity in newspaper reporting was the founding of the Associated Press. After the invention of the telegraph, news dissemination became faster than ever before, and to keep standards of acceptable news for all of its publications objective reporting became the AP standard. Although it is important to note that Schudson does not define this as the pivotal moment in the change to objectivity, saying “changes in the ideals of journalism did not translate technological changes into occupational norms,” (5).

Post-World War I cynicism from wartime propaganda and public relations also led to a rise in objectivity in reporting. The Hutchins Commission, which in 1947 addressed problems in journalism and reasserted the belief in the social responsibility of journalism, called for an increase in objectivity. The Commission outlined journalistic responsibilities, including remaining free from distortion of the news, and “a commitment to a correspondence theory of truth, which gives a central role to the concept of objectivity.” (Iggers, 46).

Objectivity as a guide in journalism may have several beneficial outcomes. It decreases sensationalism, which can very easily distort the truth and present an inaccurate picture of events. It also promotes efficient dissemination of news and information. The most relevant facts are provided in a concise manner, absent from commentary and opinion. This allows the public to think independently and critically to form their own opinion on issues, instead of being led (and possibly misled) to a truth blindly. Objectivity can increase the degree of professionalism in journalism as well by setting a collection of standards for reporters and news media to adhere to.

Conversely, there are some negative aspects associated with objectivity as a journalistic method. The absence of critical thought of information and the requirement for balance has led to passive reporting, with journalists either unwilling or afraid to research and present influential facts for fear of showing bias. The proliferation of “cooked data” (Iggers, 104) has become a source of contest and confusion for most citizens, and the unwillingness of journalists to respond to it only further alienates the public from its role of informed citizens. The objective, balanced viewpoint attempted by journalists seems to be unable to meet the social requirements for the press, and to quote Iggers, “responsible journalism can neither be a-perspectival nor have the perspective of the ‘reasonable reader,’ it must be multi-perspectival.” (103).

In their book, The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories That Shape the Political World, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman offer a substitute for the use of objectivity in journalism. Rather than chasing after the elusive ideal of objectivity and resulting in a confusing, distorted description of the truth, journalists should regard themselves as “custodians of fact,” whereby reporters “discover facts, sort the relevant from the meaningless, and hold those in public life to standards of truthfulness,” (Jamieson and Waldman, 165).

Jamieson and Waldman describe the agency of journalists as custodians of fact as “informed aggressive skepticism,” quoting from David Remnick, editor of the New Yorker (Jamieson and Waldman, 165). Their conception of ideal journalistic practice focuses on pursuit of truth, not only for the facts of the story itself but also the larger situational context the story is located within, accountability for those who lead, and a skeptical attitude toward those in power. The authors offer ten principles that they believe would reduce audience confusion and grant reporters more autonomy in their roles as custodians of fact. Several of the points are related and tie in closely with one another. I found the most distinct and noteworthy principles outlined by Jamieson and Waldman to be the “reasonable person standard,” the articulation and explanation of underlying assumptions in conflicting discourse, and the contextualization of facts to a larger debate.

The “reasonable person standard” described by Jamieson and Waldman is analogous to the reasonable person standard that is used in courts of law to determine what behavior or meaning is understood from rhetoric. The authors make sure to highlight the lack of required training or knowledge necessary to gauge what a hypothetical reasonable person‘s actions would be, revealing “it is understood to be within the capability of any citizen sitting on a jury,” (Jamieson and Waldman, 172). The reasonable person standard also suggests imposing sanctions on those (mainly public figures) who repeatedly and/or maliciously use deceptive or ambiguous language to mislead the public. I think that the importance of the reasonable person standard is best described by Jamieson and Waldman when they discuss the enthymematical aspect of rhetoric.

“Meaning does not reside in texts--the words themselves-- but rather in an intersection of a sender, a receiver, and a context. In the act of constructing meaning, audiences fill in premises left unarticulated by the source and indeed sometimes unintended by the sender. Confronted by ambiguities in language, audiences read in definitions of their own, a tendency that can be exploited by cunning speakers eager to feign surprise that someone heard something that was not actually said.”
(Jamieson and Waldman, 174)

The attempted exploitation of audiences through ambiguous language, spin, or public relations maneuvers is something that journalists should keep a keen eye to according to Jamieson and Waldman, and punitive measures, whether social, professional sanctions, etc. should be exercised on those who willfully attempt to do so.

Somewhat related to the reasonable person standard is the proposition that journalists should explain, clarify and explicitly remind audiences of the underlying assumptions that institutions use when conflicting data is presented. The authors use the example of the disparities in the projected surplus offered by the White House, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Democrats in 2001. The differences in projection, as it turns out, was attributed to differing predictions of the rate of economic growth in the next ten years. It is this statistical manipulation of data and the undefined use of estimates that marks the significance of this proposition. As stated by Jamieson and Waldman, “If you don’t like the way your numbers turn out, you can simply assume higher or lower growth, more or less future spending.” (174). That is to say, if you aren’t getting the results you want to see, change your data until you find what you are looking for.

Jamieson and Waldman also recommend the association of more narrow news stories with the larger context of the issue as a whole. The information should not be simply presented for uncritical digestion and absorption, but should have relevance and meaning for its readers on a smaller, more personal scale. According to the critics of objectivity, this idea could “help the public see the connections between specific policies and larger concerns, their [reporters] successful arbitration of competing claims can enlighten the citizenry.” (186).

While I do not believe that if the guidelines proposed by Jamieson and Waldman would inherently strengthen credibility, I do think that they would have a more positive impact on the way that news is viewed and received by audiences. Most of the principles outlined by the authors seem more relevant for political reporting than journalism as a whole. However, the sum of the parts, if you will, seems to be aimed at an umbrella effort to reduce audience confusion, which I believe to be an integral foundation to the credibility and trust of the news in general. The clear definition of terms, explanation of underlying assumptions in claims, the contextualizing of news to larger public interests and other principles set forth by Jamieson and Waldman serve to reassert the belief in the competence and aptitude of the public to act in a democracy. Misleading rhetoric, spin and contradictory claims and data only alienate the general public and create a sense of cynicism towards those who are in leadership positions, and places the objective journalist in a passive role of information disseminator instead of the more active information interpreter. So while the notion of journalists as custodians of fact does not necessarily strengthen or weaken credibility per se, I do believe that a more simplified medium that focuses on the reduction in audience confusion and the spread of relevant, contextualized information would bring about a change in attitude towards journalism and the news resulting in higher levels of audience trust and confidence.