New American Militarism

In his book, New American Militarism, author Andrew Bacevich outlines four key concepts of militarism that he argues have been gradually becoming more and more present in United States policy and military use. These concepts include: the scope, cost and configuration of today’s military (p. 15); an increased propensity to use force leading to the normalization of war (p. 18); new aesthetics of war (p. 20); and the boost in status of military institutions and soldiers themselves (p. 23). Bacevich argues that these four pillars have become prevalent in the reasoning behind today’s use of the armed forces, and provides evidence throughout his book that strengthens his arguments of a new American militarism in place. I have found that the second aspect of Bacevich’s definition of militarism is most strongly allied with the war in Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Considering the second point in Bacevich’s four concepts of militarism, “increased propensity to use force,” can be adequately shown by the violation of the Powell doctrine upon entering the war. Regardless of the traditional military procedure for determining whether military action should or should not be used, America entered Iraq without “a clearly defined war strategy, end state, and exit strategy,” in direct violation of the Powell doctrine. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, also exemplified this aspect of militarism with his “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” a list of declarations that he published after joining the Pentagon that included the decree “Reserve the right to get into anything, and exercise it,” (p. 63).
Associated with this is the publication of the Bush doctrine in 2002, which announced a doctrine of “preventive war and permanent military supremacy.” (p. 93). I don’t believe that there could be a more egregious and direct association with militarism than that point. A proactive approach undermines the definition of the word “defense,” and more closely aligns with offensive measures and the use of force to spread American ideals, or as Bacevich calls it, “coercive democracy.” In fact, the Bush doctrine seems to align more closely with what the American Heritage Dictionary defines as militarism: “Predominance of the armed forces in the administration or policy of the state.” By granting himself the ability to act in a preventive manner to provide defense, and exercising that ability immediately, President Bush tacitly incorporated militarism into his administration and his policy.
More conventional arguments for the war in Iraq being only a part of the larger war on terrorism are not wholly developed, and seem to take on an ethnocentric American perspective. We see the war as a result of Islamic extremism and terrorism upon the United States. However, there is a larger context to the story as Bacevich points out in his discussion of World War IV. The role the United States has cast upon itself as an innocent party being thrust into the war by freedom-hating terrorists from the Middle East is not entirely true. A series of events participated in and promulgated by the U.S. over the course of twenty or so years has gradually been increasing anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, and still plays a part in the conflict today. Increasing American militarism and the rise of the second neoconservative movement that sanctified American values as universal and deserving distribution added to the U.S. involvement and introduction to the war in Iraq.